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Articles
Unauthorised practice of law
G E Dal Pont*
Legal profession legislation has long proscribed the unauthorized practice of
law, as an adjunct to the core notion of lawyers as professionals. This article
probes and then unpacks the rationales for this proscription, before inquiring
as to how these inform its justifiable parameters, which both legislators and
judges have often found difficult to prescribe with precision.
I Introduction
Legal profession legislation has long disallowed an unauthorised person1 to
‘engage in legal practice’, or words to similar effect. For this purpose, what
authorises a person to engage in legal practice is that he or she holds a current
practising certificate issued by the relevant professional or regulatory body. As
its issue rests upon educational, practical and ethical prerequisites, not
everyone can hold a practising certificate. Accordingly, there exist barriers to
entry, to which the above proscription gives effect, functioning to vest in those
who have met the prerequisites a monopoly on engaging in legal practice.
Governments with monopolies with suspicion, fearing that the monopolist
will be positioned to exercise undue market power. The rise of competition
law is testament to this. But this does not mean that barriers to entering a trade,
profession or business, which confer some element of monopoly power, are
necessarily contrary to the public interest. On various occasions, society (and
government) accepts that certain services, in particular, cannot be supplied
purely at the whim of the market (albeit remaining subject to generic
consumer protection provisions), but must be confined to a class of
appropriately qualified individuals. And this is so even though this places
those individuals, vis-a-vis the broader public, in a position of some power or
privilege. The assumption, in these instances, is that the public nonetheless
secures a net benefit by reason of the relevant restriction.
Yet there remains tension between barriers to entry to the legal profession
— with its resultant monopoly on the provision of legal services — and the
broader public benefit. Aweighty part of this surrounds whether the profession
is sufficiently committed to public service to justify its privileged (monopoly)
status, attached to concerns pertaining to abuses of privileged position. The
modern catchcry of access to justice, where the cost of legal services proves
a substantial impediment for many, has refocused attention on the scope of the
proscription on unauthorised legal practice. Coupled with the latter having
* Faculty of Law, University of Tasmania.
1 This article uses the terminology ‘unauthorised’ in place of ‘unqualified’ because practising
certificates give a person authority to engage in legal practice; a person may be ‘qualified’
to practise law but not hold a practising certificate.
224
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 17 SESS: 15 OUTPUT: Wed Jun 20 16:48:35 2018
/journals/journal/abr/vol45pt3/part_3
received relatively little exposure in recent academic commentary,2 it is apt to
probe and unpack the rationale for the proscription, before inquiring as to how
this informs its justifiable parameters, which ensue as the primary subject of
this article.
II The proscription and its rationales
The statutory proscription on engaging in the practice of law without a current
practising certificate is treated with such seriousness by respective parliaments
that its breach is declared an offence, in some jurisdictions potentially
punishable by imprisonment.3 Perhaps the most patent breach of the
proscription occurs where a person without legal qualification purports to
practise law. But it is not so confined. It can operate in any instance where a
person engages in legal practice without a current practising certificate. This
may include a person who holds a law degree but is not admitted to practice,
a person who is admitted to practice but does not hold a practising certificate
(uniformly termed by the legal profession statutes as an ‘Australian lawyer’),
or a person who once held but no longer maintains a current practising
certificate (whether by reason of removal or suspension, or simply by not
renewing it). Importantly, the proscription, as it is expressed, applies with
equal vigour in each case.
While, as discussed later in the article, the parameters of ‘legal practice’ are
not always precise, what drives the unauthorised practice proscription appears
clear. As explained by Buddin J in Law Society of New South Wales v
Seymour,4 ‘[i]t is axiomatic that the public at large must be protected from the
activities of persons who are not qualified, or not otherwise entitled, to act as
solicitors, but who nonetheless seek to conduct themselves as if they are.’ The
same surfaces in manifold other judicial statements,5 and finds reiteration in
the relevant objectives of the Legal Profession Uniform Law 2014 (NSW), ‘to
ensure, in the interests of the administration of justice, that legal work is
carried out only by those who are properly qualified to do so’ and ‘to protect
clients of law practices by ensuring that persons carrying out legal work are
entitled to do so’.6 By reference to the monopoly mentioned earlier, it was
2 A notable exception is Jane Knowler and Rachel Spencer, ‘Unqualified Persons and the
Practice of Law’ (2014) 16 Flinders Law Journal 203.
3 Legal Profession Act 2006 (ACT) s 16(1); Legal Profession Uniform Law 2014 (NSW)
s 10(1) (includes potential for imprisonment); Legal Profession Act 2006 (NT) s 18(1);
Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) s 24(1) (includes potential for imprisonment); Legal
Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) s 21(1); Legal Profession Act 2007 (Tas) s 13(1) (includes
potential for imprisonment); Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (Vic)
sch 1 s 10(1) (includes potential for imprisonment); Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) s 12(2).
4 [2004] NSWSC 493 (3 June 2004) [6].
5 See, eg, Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v McCaffery [2004]
NSWCA 470 (17 December 2004) [36]–[38] (McColl JA; Sheller and Beazley JJA
concurring); Legal Practice Board v Taylor [2005] WASC 242 (8 January 2005) [33]
(Hasluck J); Legal Practice Board v Clohessy [2006] WASC 21 (2 February 2006) [18] (E M
Heenan J); Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Layton [2008] NSWSC 606 (18
June 2008) [37] (Hislop J); Legal Practice Board v Giraudo [2010] WASC 4 (14 January
2010) [11] (Hall J).
6 Legal Profession Uniform Law 2014 (NSW) s 9; Legal Profession Uniform Law Application
Act 2014 (Vic) sch 1 s 9.
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elaborated by the Supreme Court of Western Australia in Legal Practice
Board v Mullally as follows:
Whilst sometimes referred to as the monopoly provisions, these ... provisions ... exist
for the protection of the public and not for the protection of legal practitioners. They
are designed to ensure that the public receives legal advice and representation only
from those who are properly qualified, are fit and proper and in every respect a
person of good fame and character ... The public are entitled to be assured that those
who undertake the important task of advising and representing them in relation to
their legal affairs not only have sufficient knowledge to do so, but are also bound by
ethical restraints and standards of responsible conduct.7
The latter point has been expressed by reference to it being essential for courts
that lawyers ‘who provide legal advice in relation to legal proceedings and/or
who appear in such proceedings are subject to ethical and other constraints
and to the potential sanctions that arise in the event of a breach of professional
duty’.8
What resonates in these judicial remarks is that the primary function of the
unauthorised practice proscription is competence-related, aiming to protect
the public from the provision of legal services that are not of the requisite
standard. With this the (prospective) consumer has a degree of assurance that
the person(s) whom he or she engages to provide legal services will be
sufficiently competent. A secondary, but equally pervasive, rationale is that
those authorised to practice law are committed to ethical behaviour. These
points are encapsulated in the relevant American restatement, which speaks of
the ‘primary justification’ for unauthorised practice limitations as ‘to protect
consumers of unauthorized practitioner services against the significant risk of
harm believed to be threatened by the nonlawyer practitioner’s incompetence
or lack of ethical constraints’.9 It is accordingly appropriate to investigate how
the holding of a current practising certificate feeds into these rationales, which
forms the subject matter of the ensuing discussion.
III Unpacking the rationales
A Competence
The competence-focused rationale can be readily understood from a consumer
protection perspective. It is trite to observe that the bulk of consumers engage
a lawyer to provide legal services precisely because they lack the requisite
knowledge and skill to perform those services themselves. For this reason, in
large part, most clients are not well-positioned to assess a lawyer’s
competence. This accordingly bespeaks of a need to provide some avenue to
certify that competence.
It cannot be denied that core to an assurance (to the extent possible) of
competence is successful completion of a recognised course of academic
study coupled with practical legal training. Yet this certification, at least when
it comes to these requirements, is a ‘once and for all’ exercise. Leaving aside,
7 [2003] WASC 225 (12 November 2003) [3] (Johnson J).
8 Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Davison [2006] NSWSC 65 (28 February
2006) [43] (Hall J) (‘Davison’).
9 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers (2000) § 4 cmt (b) (emphasis supplied).
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for the moment, ongoing (now mandatory) continuing legal education
requirements (addressed below), questions of ‘special skill and learning’
represent a threshold for entry into the legal practice domain, and to this end
(at least in a sense) presuppose that what is covered as part of these courses
of study maintains a lasting influence otherwise lacking in persons who have
not completed the entire course of study.
The academic content of law study, while a threshold requirement for legal
practice, cannot be assured of being maintained as a ready reference by
practitioners. Knowledge once gained is not always retained, something
acknowledged judicially.10 Yet lawyers are certified, by virtue of academic and
practical legal training, across a gamut of legal topics that have, for nearly
3 decades now, been viewed (albeit not always without dissent) as essential to
legal practice. The study of this concatenation of legal topics (coupled with
meeting the good fame and character threshold) is what differentiates the
person eligible to hold a practising certificate from one who is not. As
indicated above, though, the relevant knowledge, at least in its breadth, is
fleeting at best. And the modern push to specialisation with legal practice has
arguably exacerbated the point.
If the primary concern underscoring unauthorised practice, at least for those
who possess a law degree (and have completed a practical legal training
course), is the protection of the public from incompetence, one could
legitimately expect something about holding a current practising certificate
going to competence. Maintaining competence was, however, traditionally
viewed as a practising lawyer’s personal commitment rather than anything to
be compelled or otherwise regulated. Members of the profession were trusted
to maintain their competence, at least within their fields of endeavour. An
NSW judge, to this end, made the following observation in 1981:
The minimum standards include ... basic legal knowledge and application to keep
abreast of the law in his field of practice ... It would seem to follow that a solicitor
fit to remain on the roll must make reasonable efforts to keep up with current
developments in his field of practice. In a world of rapid change, he must try to keep
up to date.11
Curiously, very little in parallel judicial remarks surfaces before the 1980s; the
push towards maintaining competence appears to have propelled primarily
from this moment forward. The assumption, presumably, was that the law of
negligence would function as a backstop and, beyond a commitment to the
‘best’ professional service for their clients, lawyers’ self-interest in avoiding
the prospect being sued in tort (and the consequent cost, inconvenience and
reputational hit) would motivate efforts to maintain competence.
In July 1994, the Law Council of Australia, in its Blueprint for the Structure
of the Legal Profession, stated that ‘it is incumbent on all lawyers to remain
10 Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v Finn (1961) 106 CLR 60, 69 (Dixon CJ) (in support of a
conclusion that self-education expenses are not to be treated as capital for tax deductibility
purposes, remarking that ‘[y]ou cannot treat an improvement of knowledge in a professional
man as the equivalent of an extension of plant in a factory ... [It does] not endure like bricks
and mortar.’).
11 Law Society of New South Wales v Moulton [1981] 2 NSWLR 736 (26 November 1981) 751
(Hutley JA).
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current with issues of law and legal practice through informal and formal
continuing legal education’, expressing it ‘as desirable that persons practising
as barristers and solicitors should complete ten hours of formal continuing
legal education each year’.12
Of course, as foreshadowed earlier, lawyers are nowadays subjected to
mandatory continuing legal education (‘MCLE’), uniformly totalling the
equivalent of 10 hours each year. As this is one of conditions for maintaining
a current practising certificate, this evidently goes to what distinguishes a
qualified practising lawyer from one who is not (which is in turn a driver for
unauthorised practice proscriptions). Yet this is a relatively recent
phenomenon. New South Wales was the first Australian jurisdiction to make
CLE mandatory, in 1987, some 12 years after the first such initiative in the
United States (in Minnesota), where now almost all states have MCLE. The
MCLE take-up in other Australian jurisdictions proved slower, but has since
eventuated13 (accelerated, in part, by the risk management process
underscoring liability capping under the professional standards regime).14
Most evidently, mere attendance — whether in person, at a distance or
otherwise electronically — at an MCLE function hardly assures genuine
translation into increased (or renewed) competence pertaining to the subject
matter presented. This form over substance (‘tick a box’) approach to
‘competence certification’, interestingly, proved a driver for the Solicitors
Regulation Authority in the United Kingdom, as part of a wider program
moving from processes to outcomes, to recently resile from MCLE, and in its
place prescribe a high-level description of competencies required of solicitors
to inform their professional development needs, tailored to the individual
lawyer or firm practice.15 There is, in any event, to date little clear empirical
12 Law Council of Australia, Blueprint for the Structure of the Legal Profession: A National
Market for Legal Services (1994).
13 Law Society of the ACT, ‘CPD Guidelines: A continuing professional development scheme
for Canberra’s legal practitioners’ (Law Council of Australia, 7 February 2017)
<https://www.actlawsociety.asn.au/documents/item/1124>; Legal Profession (Barristers)
Rules 2014 (ACT) r 113 (see ACT Bar Association, Professional Development & CPD
Program (11 May 2016) <https://www.actbar.com.au/barristers/professional-development-
cpd>); Legal Profession Uniform Continuing Professional Development (Solicitors) Rules
2015 (NSW); Legal Profession Uniform Continuing Professional Development (Barristers)
Rules 2015 (NSW); Legal Profession Regulations 2007 (NT) sch 2; Queensland Law Society
Administration Rule 2005 (Qld) pt 6; Bar Association of Queensland, CPD Policy (10
November 2015) <https://www.qldbar.asn.au/baq/v1/viewDocument?documentId=55>;
Rules of the Legal Practitioners Education and Admission Council 2004 (SA) r 3A, app C
(effective 1 April 2011); South Australian Bar Association, Barristers’ Conduct Rules, rr
127–31; Law Society of Tasmania, Practice Guideline No 4 — Continuing Professional
Development Scheme (16 March 2015); Legal Profession Uniform Continuing Professional
Development (Solicitors) Rules 2015 (Vic); Legal Profession Uniform Continuing
Professional Development (Barristers) Rules 2015 (Vic); Legal Profession Rules 2009 (WA)
pt 2.
14 See Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) sch 4; Professional Standards Act 1994 (NSW);
Professional Standards Act 2004 (NT); Professional Standards Act 2004 (Qld); Professional
Standards Act 2004 (SA); Professional Standards Act 2005 (Tas); Professional Standards
Act 2003 (Vic); Professional Standards Act 1997 (WA); Treasury Legislation Amendment
(Professional Standards) Act 2004 (Cth).
15 See Solicitors Regulation Authority, ‘New approach to CPD starts from April this year’
(News Release, 13 February 2015) <https://www.sra.org.uk/sra/news/press/lsb-approves-
228 (2018) 45 Australian Bar Review
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evidence that MCLE has indeed improved competence, and thereby offered
enhanced public protection underscoring the unqualified practice proscription.
Its value proceeds more on assumption, as part of a broader risk management
strategy. (And if increased exposure to continuing education in reality
translates to increased competence, it should be observed that accountants,
who compete with lawyers at least for certain types of work, are subject to
much more onerous mandatory continuing professional development
(‘MCPD’) requirements;16 it may be noted, also, that MCPD requirements for
Australian accountants predated any for Australian lawyers.)
B Ethics
The above assumption operates not unlike that underscoring the American Bar
Association’s declaration that, as part of their accreditation, US law schools
mandate the study of legal ethics in the law degree program. This requirement,
introduced in the wake of the Watergate scandal, responded to the fact that
many of the principal actors therein were lawyers, including some of the most
senior lawyers in the land, who nonetheless opted to outright lie. States
thereafter began to mandate ethics portions to bar examinations, and (as now
across Australia) also ethics components to MCLE. Yet it seems somewhat
obtuse to believe that, had the principal actors in Watergate been schooled in
legal ethics as part of their Juris Doctor degree (in the case of Richard Nixon,
over 30 years earlier while at Duke University), the consequent untruths
would never have ensued.
Australia not uncommonly follows American trends, and in this regard
there is no exception. It is now common throughout Australia for legal ethics
(or the like) to form part of the core of the law degree program, in addition to
its traditional exposure as part of practical legal training courses. Whether or
not, in Australia or the United States, this has improved ethical standards and
practice (assuming that these are measurable) — and there is, in any case, little
in the way of compelling empirical evidence either way — it has translated
into a renewed focus on the ‘ethical’ (as opposed to competence) hurdle to be
overcome in the path to practising law without falling foul of the unauthorised
practice proscription, namely that an applicant for admission be currently of
‘good fame and character’. While the number of Australian cases that have
probed an applicant’s fame and character has grown, and in some senses the
bar has been raised (for instance, regarding questions of academic misconduct,
which saw little airplay preceding the turn of the millennium),17 in the main
the ‘good fame and character’ threshold is not unduly onerous. It usually rests
upon inquiry into matters disclosed by an applicant more so than any
investigation by the relevant body on its own volition. For practical purposes,
‘good fame and character’ is assumed pursuant to the omission of any
(disclosed) matter that could cast a shadow over it.
Until relatively recent times, ongoing good fame and character was likewise
cpd-change.page> (the existing 16 annual hours of mandatory continuing legal education
(‘MCLE’) ended from November 2016, albeit with an opt-out option from November 2015).
16 Both CPA Australia and the Institute of Chartered Accountants require 120 hours of CPD
over a 3-year period.
17 See G E Dal Pont, Lawyers’ Professional Responsibility (Lawbook Co, 6th ed, 2017) 48–9.
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assumed, pending the relevant professional or regulatory body being apprised
of questionable practice (or non-practice) behaviour. The process of
professional discipline, and the investigations underscoring it, was the control
on a lawyer’s ongoing good fame and character. While this remains the
primary control in this context, lawyers are now obligated, pursuant to statute,
to self-disclose to the relevant regulator certain events that may cast doubt
over their good fame and character. Again, this is a relatively recent
phenomenon, first appearing by way of amendment to the Legal Profession
Act 1987 (NSW), with effect from 27 July 2001,18 in the wake of another
(albeit not so monumental) scandal. The latter was, embarrassingly, reported
in the television program A Current Affair, and targeted the poor compliance
by lawyers (including senior barristers and judges) with their tax obligations.
In particular, the journalistic inquiry revealed lawyers who had avoided
paying tax for years (even decades) who, when the evasion (finally) came to
the attention of the authorities, filed for bankruptcy.
That the consequent statutory obligation had (and maintains) a direct
relationship to the issue and retention of a practising certificate presents as one
of the few post-admission controls on practising lawyers’ good fame and
character that do not rest upon a (usually client) complaint. The amendments
to the 1987 NSW Act, which have since translated in equivalent form to the
both the current NSWAct as well as relevant Acts in all other Australian states
and territories,19 oblige an applicant for a practising certificate, and also the
current holder of a practising certificate, who has committed a
bankruptcy-related event or been found guilty of a serious or tax offence
(collectively a ‘show cause event’), to provide a written statement to the
relevant body within set time frames showing why he or she nonetheless
remains a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate. Mention of
‘bankruptcy-related events’ and ‘tax offences’ (even if not ‘serious’) speak of
the events that propelled these provisions. The relevant body may refuse to
issue, or may cancel or suspend, a practising certificate if the applicant or
holder has:
• failed to fulfil to notify of a show cause event (assuming, of course,
that the body is aware of this);
• provided such a statement that does not show him or her to be a fit
and proper person to hold a practising certificate; or
• failed, without reasonable excuse, to properly comply with a
requirement made in connection with an investigation for this
purpose.
A contravention of the above requirement is, moreover, declared to be
professional misconduct or (in New South Wales and Victoria) capable of
constituting professional misconduct or unsatisfactory professional conduct.
18 Pursuant to the Legal Profession Amendment (Disciplinary Provisions) Act 2001 (NSW),
which introduced a new div 1AA to Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW) pt 3 (comprising
ss 38FA–38FJ).
19 See Legal Profession Act 2006 (ACT) div 2.4.7; Legal Profession Uniform Law 2014
(NSW) pt 3.5 div 4; Legal Profession Act 2006 (NT) pt 2.3 div 6; Legal Profession Act 2007
(Qld) pt 2.4 div 7; Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) pt 3 div 2B; Legal Profession Act 2007
(Tas) pt 2.3 div 7; Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (Vic) sch 1 pt 3.5
div 4; Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) pt 5 div 7.
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There is, as a result, something about the holding of a practising certificate
that, independent of a substantiated (client) complaint (and consequent
disciplinary sanction), serves to foster public confidence in the ethics of the
profession. That this self-disclosure obligation is, however, confined largely to
the events that propelled it dictates its irrelevance for the broader span of
lawyer (mis)behaviour. Good fame and character (and associated ethical
standards), within that span, remains to be addressed through the disciplinary
process in the main.
C Upshot
The foregoing reveals that there is relatively little in the issue of a practising
certificate that, of itself, bespeaks of special skill and learning, and the
competence it is designed to inform. At least at an academic level, this is the
province of university study of law; at a practical level, admission to practice
is a product of either a dedicated legal practice course or supervised work
experience. At the admission stage, applicants must also overcome the ‘good
fame and character’ hurdle; the issue of a practising certificate has
traditionally involved no further competence or character inquiry. From the
perspective of protecting the public from incompetent or unethical lawyers,
the issue of a practising certificate has generally performed no substantial
function (except to the extent that there are conditions placed on the scope of
practice allowed under the certificate, or that must otherwise be fulfilled by the
lawyer).20 The proscription on unauthorised practice nonetheless targets
persons who do not hold a current practising certificate, even if they otherwise
meet the academic, practical and ethical prerequisites.
Of course, as noted above, the issue and maintenance of a practising
certificate is nowadays not entirely devoid of matters going to competence and
ethics. But the relevant initiatives set no substantive competence or ethical
hurdle; MCLE does not guarantee competence, and show cause events are
confined in scope. Beyond its symbolic significance, the principal upshot of
the issue of a practising certificate is attendant coverage by professional
indemnity insurance,21 and client access to the fidelity fund for certain law
practice defaults.22 While these perform a consumer protection function, it is
chiefly as a backup to the primary liability, which lies in the legal practitioner.
20 Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Kintominas [2017] NSWCATOD 167
(22 November 2017) [62] (where the tribunal noted that while ‘[o]rdinarily, a practitioner is
permitted to practise unencumbered by special conditions’, the imposition of special
conditions ‘points to concern on the part of the regulator that the public needs additional
degrees of protection from possible harm, beyond those conferred by the requirements for
admission to practice and the disclosures and commitments that form part of the annual
practising certificate cycle’).
21 Legal Profession Act 2006 (ACT) s 311; Legal Profession Uniform Law 2014 (NSW) s 211;
Legal Profession Act 2006 (NT) s 376; Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) s 353; Legal
Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) s 19; Legal Profession Act 2007 (Tas) s 45; Legal Profession
Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (Vic) sch 1 s 211; Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) s 40.
22 See generally Legal Profession Act 2006 (ACT) pt 3.4; Legal Profession Uniform Law 2014
(NSW) pt 4.5; Legal Profession Act 2006 (NT) pt 3.5; Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld)
pt 3.6; Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) s 57, pt 5; Legal Profession Act 2007 (Tas) pt 3.5;
Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (Vic) sch 1 pt 4.5; Legal Profession Act
2008 (WA) pt 12.
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That primary liability remains even if the practitioner does not hold a (current)
practising certificate. After all, a person who holds himself or herself out as a
practising lawyer owes the same duties to the ‘client’ at general law as a
qualified or certificated lawyer would owe.23
IV Competence as a parameter-setter
The principal rationale for the unauthorised practice proscription is, as
explained earlier, to protect the public by prescribing the fulfilment of
competence thresholds. Granted that competence, at least in an assessed form,
is chiefly the product of academic and practical qualifications rather than
grounded in the issue of a practising certificate, it cannot but inform the
interpretation (and thus parameters) of the proscription. The latter aims, it is
said, to ‘distinguish tasks that can only be performed by trained and licensed
lawyers from tasks that lay people, lacking the same training ... can
nevertheless provide competently [and] reliably’.24 And this inquiry cannot be
viewed independently of pressures to free up (aspects of) the legal market so
as to promote greater (chiefly price) competition. Any changing in perceptions
of what is the ‘practice of law’, to this end, can impact upon the parameters
of the unauthorised practice proscription.
Even within the legal profession, the market for legal services has become
more competitive in time. Swelling in the number of practising lawyers in
Australia, per capita well outstripping increases in population25 (and arguably
the amount of legal work), itself speaks to this. Lawyer-client costs disclosure,
moreover, represents a statutory measure implemented to, inter alia, foster
greater competition within the profession’s ranks. But competition also
emerges from outside the profession, underscored by the notion that the
competence expected of practising lawyers, which drives the unauthorised
practice proscription, is not essential to every legal-type task. This view is
hardly without supporters, including some influential academics.26
A Opening up the legal market
Legal work that, it is argued, should not be exclusive province of practising
certificate holders, can comprise chiefly routine or formulaic tasks. This, many
maintain, does not require the (supposed) intellect required for entry into a law
degree or that underscoring its conferral, or justify what many (aspiring) law
students and lawyers envisage as a high income. Document templates, forms
or precedents have become the domain of online and other non-lawyer service
23 See, eg, Braham v Catalano [2013] VSC 437 (30 August 2013) (where the defendant, who
illegitimately held himself out to the plaintiff as a practising solicitor, was found liable in tort
and breach of fiduciary duty in representing the plaintiff in a conveyancing transaction).
24 Dana Remus and Frank Levy, ‘Can Robots be Lawyers? Computers, Lawyers and the
Practice of Law’ (2017) 30 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 501, 542.
25 See the report prepared for the Law Society of New South Wales by Urbis, ‘National Profile
of Solicitors 2016 Report’ (24 August 2017) 3, which reveals that, in the period 2011–16, the
number of solicitors in Australia increased by 24.2 per cent. Within the same time frame, the
total population increased by only 8 per cent.
26 See, eg, Deborah L Rhode and Lucy Buford Ricca, ‘Protecting the Profession or the Public?
Rethinking Unauthorized-Practice Enforcement’ (2014) 82 Fordham Law Review 2587.
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providers,27 which almost invariably undercut lawyers on price. Routine legal
work is also the most amenable to being (at least partly) performed by
computer, through artificial intelligence in its various permutations28
(although predictions that the profession’s days are numbered for this reason29
do appear to understate the ‘irreducibly human’30 nature of much legal work;
say, legal writing, advising clients, communications/interactions, court
appearances, and negotiation).31
The (then) Trade Practices Commission, in a 1994 report, recommended
that some areas of legal practice be opened up to appropriately trained
non-lawyers, including conveyancing, taxation, wills and probate, simple
incorporations, uncontested divorce, simple civil claims and welfare
advocacy.32 These recommendations were reiterated in a 2014 Productivity
Commission report.33 Most Australian jurisdictions now empower non-lawyer
conveyancers to perform certain conveyancing services for reward, subject to
a licensing regime established by statute.34 New Zealand, via its Lawyers and
Conveyancers Act 2006 (NZ), created a profession of conveyancing
practitioners to perform conveyancing work in competition with lawyers,
while applying essentially the same regulatory scheme to both.
There have been similar calls,35 and a yielding to corresponding pressures,
elsewhere. For instance, under the Legal Services Act 2007 (UK), the Institute
of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales can now issue licences to
enable its members to undertake probate work,36 thereby becoming the first
non-legal body in the United Kingdom to actually regulate legal services. The
Canadian province of Ontario, from 2007, licensed paralegals to assist clients
with small claims matters, traffic offences, landlord-tenant disputes,
27 In the United States, eg, LegalZoom (via its website <www.legalzoom.com>) promotes
itself as ‘the nation’s leading provider of personalized, online legal solutions and legal
documents for small businesses and families’, and provides document templates for, inter
alia, company incorporations, trusts, leases, wills, divorces, bankruptcy, powers of attorney,
etc.
28 In the Australian context, it has been observed that ‘without this technology, and the ability
of law firms to use it in an increasingly sophisticated way, no one could undertake
meaningful discovery in complex cases in anywhere near a sensible time frame at anything
resembling a reasonable price’: Tony Joyner, ‘The inevitable surprise: How technology will
change what we do’ (2017) 44(10) Brief 14, 16.
29 See, eg, Richard Susskind, Tomorrow’s Lawyers: An Introduction to your Future (Oxford
University Press, 2nd ed, 2017).
30 Remus and Levy, above n 4, 503.
31 See the compelling discussion in ibid.
32 Trade Practices Commission, Study of the Professions: Legal, Final Report (1994) 67–71.
33 Productivity Commission, Access to Justice Arrangements, Inquiry Report Overview No 72
(2014) 21.
34 Conveyancers Licensing Act 2003 (NSW); Agents Licensing Act 1979 (NT) s 5 (applies to,
inter alia, conveyancing agents); Conveyancers Act 1994 (SA); Conveyancing Act 2004
(Tas); Conveyancers Act 2006 (Vic); Settlement Agents Act 1981 (WA) pt III. As to the
history of conveyancers in Australia, see Sande v Registrar, Supreme Court (Qld) (1996) 64
FCR 123, 135–45 (Lockhart J).
35 See, eg, Leslie C Levin, ‘The Monopoly Myth and Other Tales about the Superiority of
Lawyers’ (2014) 82 Fordham Law Review 2611; Laurel A Rigertas, ‘The Legal Profession’s
Monopoly: Failing to Protect Consumers’ (2014) 82 Fordham Law Review 2683.
36 Legal Services Act 2007 (UK) sch 4, sch 5 cl 2A.
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administrative matters and minor criminal offences.37 And 5 years hence, in an
initiative that has attracted interest by other states in the United States,
Washington introduced a regime to qualify and licence non-lawyer ‘Legal
Technicians’ to provide limited legal advice pertaining to domestic relations.38
There are common elements to each of the above intrusions into the
monopoly lawyers otherwise enjoy(ed) as a result of skill- and learning-based
barriers to entry. Conveyancing, beyond assumed to be heavily formulaic,
involves tasks confined to a particular endeavour, and it is reasoned that to
perform this task conveyancers do not require the breadth of legal knowledge
vested in lawyers. What dissolving the conveyancing monopoly has done, in
line with its object, is render conveyancing more affordable. Whether in
England accountants will be able to perform probate work any more cheaply
(or as competently) as lawyers remains to be seen. But together the scenarios
that have propelled the changes in Ontario and Washington state, what are
involved are areas where the costs of the relevant services may prove
disproportionate to the issues or property at stake. Much of probate work, it
is reasoned, can be adequately performed by a clerk, at a lower fee, than a
lawyer. And the smaller the claim, the greater the prospect that costs incurred
to pursue or defend it will become disproportionate.
The upshot of the foregoing is a belief, which has significant carriage, that
various aspects of lawyers’work do not require skill and knowledge necessary
to confine performance to certified lawyers. If others can perform this work
with sufficient competence but at a lower cost, society as a whole gains. Of
course, riders must apply. It is no coincidence that the various intrusions into
lawyers’monopoly have spawned their own regulatory regimes. This indicates
legislators’ acknowledgement of the value of the relevant services, and as a
consequence the need for some control over their delivery.
To presuppose areas of legal endeavour that are sufficiently self-contained
to justify a more constrained competence requirement — not one that requires
the full spectrum of legal knowledge assumed to be conveyed (and certified)
by a law degree — risks fragmenting the very character of legal work and, in
the language of the legislation, what is meant by ‘engaging in legal practice’.
It opens the door, in addition, to other potential incursions into lawyers’
traditional domain. Some other areas of legal practice, it could be argued, do
not require knowledge of core areas of law. An example may be the practice
of criminal law. Could it be said, for instance, that a person who has
successfully completed units on criminal law, criminal procedure and
evidence — being what is required under the ‘Priestley 11’39 so far as the
study of criminal law is concerned — with some targeted practical legal
training attached, should be sufficiently competent to practise criminal law?
Does the same person also need to be certified as to knowledge of, say,
contract, tort, property, equity, constitutional law, administrative law, etc?
Police prosecutors, after all, perform competently in lower courts without this
37 Law Society Act, RSO 1990, c L.8 s 1(8).5 (as amended by the Access to Justice Act,
SO 2006, c 21 sch C).
38 See Benjamin P Cooper, ‘Access to Justice without Lawyers’ (2014) 47 Akron Law Review
205, 217–21.
39 Law Council of Australia, Historical Documents <https://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/
resources/law-admissions-consultative-committee/historical-documents>.
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broader knowledge or training. While this is perhaps a reason (coupled with
most criminal defence work being funded under the auspices of legal aid) that
to date there has been not significant pressure to ‘open up’ criminal law work
to a broader cohort, absent a compelling justification for the complete span of
law study that comprises Australian law degrees (and practical legal training
courses) as a foundation for the ability to practise in specific areas of law, the
profession is increasingly vulnerable to this reasoning.
B Law as incidental to another endeavour
The above presents scenarios where persons not otherwise trained in, and
certified as to, the full gamut of legal study, can in a sense engage in legal
practice without a lawyer practising certificate. In other scenarios, despite not
always being discrete from the former, a non-legal endeavour may involve a
person engaging in what may be seen as the provision of legal advice
incidentally to the performance of that endeavour. That the law infuses
practically every relationship, transaction or dealing makes it difficult, in the
performance of many non-legal endeavours, to entirely eschew some legal
exposure. Manifold university courses of non-legal study, to this end,
prescribe law-focused units. Examples include study that is medical and
health-related, or that has a primary focus on social work, surveying,
journalism, town planning, management, etc.
There are other endeavours not certified through university study or degrees
that nonetheless evince a (limited) legal slant. Real estate (and other
commission) agents invariably deal with legal documents, and assist persons
in completing those documents, in circumstances that do not always involve
an unmodified standard form or content easily understood by the layperson.
The same may be said regarding the performance of standard tasks by
financial institutions, insurance agents or brokers, and financial planners.
Migration agents, like lawyers, clearly represent clients in proceedings before
courts and tribunals and, within their scope of work, can be said to provide
legal advice and services. (It is perhaps telling that, in each of these instances,
parliaments have opted to implement regulatory schemas.) And this is without
also probing manifold websites that include legal-type information, and spruik
legal-type services, while at the same time decrying any function of engaging
in legal practice.40
Arguably the most common potential overlap in this context, however,
involves business or accounting study. Non-legally trained accountants (that
is, most of them) provide advice when it comes to tax law. (Again, it should
be noted, so far as tax is concerned, a regulatory scheme has been put into
place, where a person must be a registered tax agent in order to provide a ‘tax
agent service’.)41 While these persons may, within university study, have
successfully passed units in contract, company or commercial law (in addition
40 Eg, multiple industrial advocacy firms clearly provide advice and representation services
that could otherwise fall within lawyers’ domain. At the same time, they disclaim actually
providing legal advice. A website of one such provider contains the following disclaimer, in
capitals: ‘Absolutely nothing on this site constitutes legal advice. A Whole New Approach
Pty Ltd is not a law firm and we are not solicitors’ (see A Whole New Approach (9 June
2005) <www.awna.com.au>).
41 Tax Agent Services Act 2009 (Cth) s 50.5 (a ‘tax agent service’ being defined in s 90.5).
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to a tax unit), the same cannot ordinarily be said regarding any dedicated study
of trusts, equity or property law. Few would deny that an understanding of
these latter areas is germane to an understanding of tax law, and indeed to
other aspects of accounting and business advice. And it cannot be gainsaid that
accountants, in dealing with companies, partnerships, trusts and contracts to
which their clients are parties, necessarily skirt the boundaries of legal advice
or representation. Yet there seems little real societal or regulatory concern that
(tax) accountants might lack the structured and certified knowledge in fields
apropos their practices. The public, it is assumed, is adequately protected by
existing (non-law) regulatory regimes.
Debate surrounding the extent to which accountants traverse into the legal
arena, chiefly in tax work but not so confined, has been longstanding, without
ever genuinely reaching a climax, even as accountants have moved from mere
compliance work to consulting/advice spheres. In 1951, at a time when
compliance work was the predominant function of accountants vis-a`-vis tax
law, a Minnesota judge made the following observations:
the distinction between law practice and that which is not may be determined only
from a consideration of the nature of the acts of service performed in each case. No
difficulty arises where such service is the primary business of the actor. We then have
law practice. Difficulty comes, however, when the service furnished is incidental to
the performance of other service of a nonlegal character in the pursuit of another
calling such as that of accounting. In the field of income taxation ... we have an
overlapping of both law and accounting. An accountant must adapt his accounting
skill to the requirements of tax law, and therefore he must have a workable
knowledge of law as applied to his field. By the same token, a lawyer must have
some understanding of accounting. In the income tax area, they occupy much
common ground where the skills of both professions may be required and where it
is difficult to draw a precise line to separate their respective functions. The public
interest does not permit an obliteration of all lines of demarcation. We cannot escape
reality by hiding behind a facade of nomenclature and assume that ‘taxation’, though
composed of both law and accounting, is something sui generis and apart from the
law ... If taxation is a hybrid of law and accounting, it does not follow that it is so
wholly without the law that its legal activities may be pursued without proper
qualifications and without court supervision.42
That accountants’ primary historical function in the tax sphere was, as noted
above, largely confined to what could be described as tax compliance work,
which lawyers did not ordinarily perform, may explain why, at least at the
outset, questions over the unauthorised practice of law generated few blips on
the radar. It also explains why they have proven very difficult, if not
practically impossible, to sustain even once accountants began to inhabit the
consulting domain, which clearly involves giving advice as to the meaning
and effect of tax (and some related) laws.
IV Boundaries of legal practice
To the extent that the legal services market is opened up to persons other than
legal practitioners, it stands to reason that the scope of the unauthorised
practice proscription is correspondingly reduced. Those who provide what
42 Gardner v Conway, 48 NW 2d 788, 796 (Matson J) (Minn, 1951).
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would otherwise have been legal services but under a different regulatory
regime do not accordingly fall foul of the relevant proscription, at least
provided that they stay within the parameters of that regime. Rather,
non-lawyer’s traversal into the legal arena as incidental to another endeavour
is the scenario that more acutely places the unauthorised practice proscription
in the sights. It is apt, accordingly, to target the wording of the proscription,
and what it reveals about the parameters of legal practice.
A Under statute
As noted at the outset, the legal profession legislation in each jurisdiction
proscribes the unauthorised practice of law. It does so by prohibiting a person,
other than the holder of a current practising certificate, from ‘engaging in legal
practice’. But nowhere does the statute attempt to define or otherwise set clear
parameters for what is ‘legal practice’, which of course goes to the core of
what is ‘unauthorised legal practice’. Most, not very helpfully, merely state
that ‘engage in legal practice’ includes practise law or, in New South Wales
and Victoria under the Legal Profession Uniform Law (‘Uniform Law’),
provide legal services.43 That the Uniform Law defines ‘legal services’ to
mean work done, or business transacted, in the ordinary course of legal
practice44 hardly represents any quantum step in defining the concept or
parameters of ‘legal practice’.
Some utility in this endeavour appears in the Australian Capital Territory
Act, if only by way of example. The relevant provision supplies five examples
of engaging in legal practice:
• preparing a will or other testamentary instrument;
• preparing an instrument creating or regulating rights between people;
• preparing an instrument relating to property or a legal proceeding;
• acting as advocate for someone in a proceeding before a court or
tribunal; [and]
• preparing papers to be used in support of, or opposition to, an
application for the grant of probate or letters of administration.45
The South Australian Act contains a provision directed to a similar end, albeit
phrased in greater detail. Like its territory counterpart, it focuses on the
preparation of various legal instruments, which by definition impact upon or
effect the rights or obligations of a client, and the representation of a party to
proceedings in a court or tribunal.46 Consistent with the chief rationale for
proscribing the unauthorised practice of law, the relevant assumption is that
legal (and practical) training, in tandem with the issue of a practising
certificate (with its attendant safeguards and controls), is vital to the
43 Legal Profession Uniform Law 2014 (NSW) s 6; Legal Profession Act 2006 (NT) s 4; Legal
Profession Act 2007 (Qld) sch 2; Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) s 5(1); Legal Profession
Act 2007 (Tas) s 4(1); Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (Vic) sch 1 s 6;
Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) s 3.
44 Legal Profession Uniform Law 2014 (NSW) s 6; Legal Profession Uniform Law Application
Act 2014 (Vic) sch 1 s 6.
45 Legal Profession Act 2006 (ACT) s 16.
46 Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) s 21(2) (expressed ‘without limiting the generality’ of the
unauthorised practice proscription found in s 21(1)).
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competent performance of these tasks. Even so, and aside from being purely
illustrative, these provisions are phrased in terms broad enough to allow not
a little leeway.
Western Australia is the only jurisdiction that purports to define ‘legal
work’. It does so in the context of what falls outside unauthorised practice,
namely (inter alia) ‘a person doing legal work under the supervision of an
Australian legal practitioner, as a paid employee of a law practice or in the
course of approved legal training’.47 ‘Legal work’ is here defined to mean:
(a) any work in connection with the administration of law; or
(b) drawing or preparing any deed, instrument or writing relating to or in
any manner dealing with or affecting —
(i) real or personal estate or any interest in real or personal estate;
or
(ii) any proceedings at law, civil or criminal, or in equity;48
Those expecting some additional insight into ‘legal work’ (or ‘legal practice’)
would accordingly be left somewhat disappointed.
Australian law is not unique in this regard. No common law jurisdiction has
purported to exhaustively set or define the parameters of legal practice.
Indeed, a commentator has suggested that the ‘practice of law’ is ‘indefinable’,
opining that no definition will distil the practice of law to its essence.49
McGowan fears that a definitional approach, framed according to the core
object of the unauthorised practice prohibition, could actually harm
consumers: if the practice of law is defined too narrowly, consumers are
exposed to incompetent (or not-yet-competent) sellers; if defined too broadly,
‘consumers are denied the benefits of competition from competent, but
unlicensed, sellers’.50 (There is also the flipside, namely the perception that
authorised practice guarantees competence; this may provide insight into why
matters of competence have now traversed into the disciplinary sphere, via
‘misconduct’ definitions51 and compensation orders.)52
B Pursuant to judicial interpretation
In areas of definitional fluidity, legislatures are prone to vest in courts the
responsibility of drawing a line, according to the facts of each case. Questions
over the unauthorised practice of law fall into this milieu. As the dividing line
rests heavily upon the facts, reciting one case illustration after another has
limited value in probing what distinguishes ‘legal practice’ from other
47 Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) s 12(3)(g).
48 Ibid s 12(1).
49 David McGowan, ‘Two Ironies of UPL Laws’ (2017) 20 Chapman Law Review 225, 226.
50 Ibid.
51 See the definition of ‘unsatisfactory professional conduct’ in: Legal Profession Act 2006
(ACT) s 386; Legal Profession Uniform Law 2014 (NSW) s 296; Legal Profession Act 2006
(NT) s 464; Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) s 418; Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) s 68;
Legal Profession Act 2007 (Tas) s 420; Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014
(Vic) sch 1 s 296; Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) s 402.
52 See Legal Profession Act 2006 (ACT) pt 4.8; Legal Profession Uniform Law 2014 (NSW)
pt 5.5; Legal Profession Act 2006 (NT) pt 4.12; Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) pt 4.10;
Legal Profession Act 2007 (Tas) pt 4.9; Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014
(Vic) sch 1 pt 5.5; Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) pt 13 div 11.
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endeavours. At the same time, courts have faced the same difficulties, when it
comes to propounding statements of principle, as have confronted legislatures.
In an ostensibly leading case, Cornall v Nagle,53 J D Phillips J couched the
meaning of ‘acting or practising as a solicitor’ (or by analogy ‘engaging in
legal practice’), albeit not exhaustively, by reference to the following forms of
behaviour:
(1) by doing something which, though not required to be done
exclusively by a solicitor, is usually done by a solicitor and by doing
it in such a way as to justify the reasonable inference that the person
doing it is a solicitor ...
(2) by doing something that is positively proscribed by the Act or by
Rules of Court unless done by a duly qualified legal practitioner ...
(3) by doing something which, in order that the public may be
adequately protected, is required to be done only by those who have
the necessary training and expertise in the law. For present purposes,
it is unnecessary to go beyond the example of the giving of legal
advice as part of a course of conduct and for reward.
While on its face promising, this categorisation in effect does little more than
fiddle with the statutory formulae or reflect, in the broadest of terms, the
rationale for the unauthorised practice proscription. The second resorts to what
statute or court rules already address by way of proscription, and so adds
nothing to the definition. The first, in being couched by reference to ‘what is
usually done by a solicitor’, does not actually define what that is. And the third
category does little more than advert to the chief rationale underscoring the
proscription, namely consumer protection. It does not, in its terms, attempt
any further step. In somewhat circular (but not unexpected or illogical)
reasoning, what qualifies a person to practice law itself is treated as defining
what it is to engage in the practice of law.
Beyond this, what is clear is that the relevant inquiry is not informed by
subjective considerations. Whether or not the person who has (allegedly)
breached the unauthorised practice proscription actually intended to do so, or
appreciated that this would be the outcome, is irrelevant. The inquiry is an
objective one. It follows that the mere fact that a person who acts on behalf of
another in a legal matter describes himself or herself by some not expressly
legal title is no defence to a charge of unauthorised legal practice if he or she
performs work that is in breach of the law.54
There may well be more compelling grounds to so find where the person in
issue has legal qualifications but no current practising certificate. The point is
53 [1995] 2 VR 188, 210, applied by Thomas J in Queensland Law Society Inc v Sande (1997)
Q Conv R 54-486, 59,871–2. There are multiple other instances where courts have addressed
the point, but without anything substantially more specific than expressed in Cornall v Nagle
[1995] 2 VR 188: see, eg, Felman v Law Institute of Victoria [1998] 4 VR 324, 352
(Kenny JA; Winneke P and Brooking JA concurring); Law Society of New South Wales v
Seymour [1999] NSWCA 117 (3 May 1999) [18]–[21] (Fitzgerald JA); Kekatos v Council of
the Law Society of New South Wales [1999] NSWCA 288 (26 August 1999) [16] (Giles JA);
Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Davison [2006] NSWSC 65 (28 February
2006) [141] (Hall J); Legal Services Commissioner v Walter [2011] QSC 132 (27 May 2011)
[23]–[29] (Daubney J).
54 Cornall v Nagle [1995] 2 VR 188, 220–2 (J D Phillips J).
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illustrated in Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Davison,55
where the defendant, following the cancellation of his practising certificate as
a barrister in 2001, established and conducted a business providing town
planning advice. In his practice at the Bar, the defendant had specialised in
local government, environmental and planning law. Hall J accepted that town
planners and lawyers may in some contexts perform ‘overlapping or similar
functions’,56 and that town planners must have an awareness and knowledge
of relevant law (including planning instruments) and update their knowledge
of relevant court decisions. His Honour agreed, more generally, that the
application of laws, legal instruments and the observance of legal principles
occurs in many fields of professional endeavour (citing hospital management,
policing, nursing and financial advising by way of example).
The relevant inquiry, though, was whether ‘a particular aspect of work
involves or requires the application of legal expertise by a legal practitioner
(in particular that of a barrister), or whether it falls within the province of a
town planner or of both’.57 When it involves ‘[t]he provision of legal advice
on matters involving legal interpretation or on legal rights or duties’,
explained Hall J, this is ‘the preserve of the legal profession’.58 On the facts,
Hall J made the following observations:
Even allowing for the fact that town planners have a knowledge of relevant law
which they bring into account as necessary, the knowledge and skill held and
exercised by the defendant in the many instances detailed in this judgment was
plainly not that of a town planner. It was acquired by him during his years in
practice, firstly, as a solicitor, and later as a member of the Bar. Whilst no doubt,
aspects of his knowledge may have overlapped the discipline of town planning in
some respects that is not determinative of the nature of his activities. The very nature
of the advice provided by him as identified in this judgment was in the nature of
legal advice which barristers are called upon to provide.
On a significant number of occasions ... the knowledge and skill applied by him was
that of a specialist barrister in the fields of local government, planning and
environmental law. The advice given on those occasions included advice as to the
legal rights or powers of local government authorities and of others. On many
occasions, the advice related to the preparation and conduct of proceedings instituted
in the Land and Environment Court. In some instances, the defendant provided
advice direct to clients. In other cases, the advice was tendered by him to solicitors
on matters involving legal issues in performance of the contract or retainer made
with [a company associated with the defenfant]. The advice required the defendant
to employ his legal and other specialist knowledge and to exercise a measure of the
skill and judgment of the specialist barrister.59
In so concluding, his Honour was influenced by the absence of evidence that
the defendant had undertaken a course of study in town planning or related
disciplines, or had obtained any accreditation or affiliation with a group or
association comprised of practitioners in the planning or any related field. That
the defendant’s only qualification was that of legal practitioner, and only a
55 [2006] NSWSC 65 (28 February 2006).
56 Ibid [41].
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid [59].
59 Ibid [145]–[146].
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very short interval elapsed between the cancellation of his practising
certificate and the commencement his new business,60 ostensibly made the
case against him all the stronger.
The decision in Davison should not be read as suggesting that a person who,
in lawful pursuit of an occupation other than law, gives advice on matters
lying within his or her occupational expertise involving the expression of an
opinion concerning requirements of relevant legislation, statutory rules and
the like, necessarily acts as a lawyer or engages in legal practice.61 Nor does
drafting an agreement by itself carry a reasonable inference that the drafter is
acting as a lawyer.62 In these circumstances, that the person in question makes
clear that he or she is acting in other than a legal capacity may carry some
sway;63 it is not necessarily decisive, though, as otherwise it would impinge
upon the objective, substance over form, approach noted earlier.
VI Where does this leave us?
It seems, therefore, that what constitutes ‘legal practice’ will, at the borders
(which themselves evince a degree of fluidity), remain difficult to prescribe
with certainty. Of course, as with any continuum, there will be cases that
clearly fall on one (or the other) side of the line. Unless authorised (and
regulated) by statute, court or tribunal, representation is the domain of legal
practitioners. As is the formulation of statements of claim or defences in civil
proceedings,64 as well as otherwise purporting to correspond on a client’s
behalf in the course of a legal dispute.65 While (assistance in) drafting legal
60 Ibid [137].
61 Felman v Law Institute of Victoria [1998] 4 VR 324, 350 (Kenny JA; Winneke P and
Brooking JA concurring) (referring, by way of example, to a person ‘in his or her capacity
as a tax agent, customs agent or migration agent’). See, eg, Law Institute of Victoria Ltd v
Maric (2008) 21 VR 1 (where Neave JA, with whom Warren CJ and Kellam JA concurred,
held that ‘it does not follow that because legal advice will sometimes be required in order
to satisfy the requirements of [Sale of Land Act 1962 (Vic)] s 32, the preparation of a
vendor’s statement inevitably requires the giving of legal advice’: at 16 [51], and ruled that
the respondent conveyancer had not been ‘engaging in legal practice’ contrary to Legal
Practice Act 1996 (Vic) s 314 in preparing statements under s 32); Defteros v Scott [2014]
VSC 205 (14 May 2014) (where Kaye J held that a non-lawyer legal cost consultant was not
engaging in legal practice contrary to the statutory proscription, but emphasised that the
decision was one on the facts in issue, and not to be taken as determining the more general
question whether a cost consultant is, or is not, engaging in legal practice: at [85]) affd
Defteros v Scott [2014] VSCA 154 (24 July 2014).
62 Orrong Strategies Pty Ltd v Village Roadshow Ltd (2007) 207 FLR 245, 448 [874]
(Habersberger J).
63 Such as where, eg, in sending a letter of demand, the sender states that he or she is acting
as an agent under power: Law Institute of Victoria Ltd v Nagle [2005] VSC 35 (24 February
2005) (see [72]–[73] (Gillard J)).
64 See, eg, Legal Practice Board v Adams [2001] WASC 78 (30 March 2001) (where the
non-lawyer respondent, who prepared two writs to commence actions in the Supreme Court,
was held to have engaged in the unauthorised practice of law).
65 See, eg, Legal Practice Board v Giraudo [2010] WASC 4 (14 January 2010) (where the
non-lawyer respondent, who assisted his employer in legal proceedings by, inter alia,
preparing court documents and letters for the employer, and attended conferences with him,
was held to have engaged in the unauthorised practice of law).
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instruments, and advice as to the nature and effect, are likewise the province
of legal practitioners, being unduly categorical in this regard may prove
inaccurate.
As foreshadowed in the first part of this article, prohibiting persons without
current practising certificates from engaging in legal practice, at the pain of
criminal sanction, serves a consumer protection agenda, protection being
needed primarily from incompetence; hence the heavily competence-focused
barriers to entering the legal profession. It should stand as no surprise, as a
result, that what is legal practice should chart the competence established by
the threshold qualifications for legal practice. Purely clerical work, to this end,
hardly requires this level of competence, and so falls outside of what the
profession can claim as exclusively within its domain. The same may be said
of multiple formulaic or routine tasks performed within a law office, albeit not
uncommonly by a non-lawyer under effective supervision. (Indeed, a failure in
effective supervision may amount to the lawyer being a party to the
non-lawyer’s unauthorised practice of law.)66
The American Bar Association’s former Model Code of Professional
Responsibility described the practice of law as ‘the rendition of services for
others that call for the professional judgment of a lawyer ... [consisting of
lawyer’s] ability to relate the general body and philosophy of law to a specific
legal problem of a client’.67 The exercise of professional judgment no doubt
dovetails into the qualifications needed to practice law, and speaks against
purely routine, formulaic or mechanistic functions, at least to the extent that
they are not concurrently also punctuated by the need for that judgment. By
way of example, an American court has remarked that ‘an individual who, in
the course of reviewing discovery documents, undertakes tasks that could
otherwise be performed entirely by a machine cannot be said to engage in the
practice of law’.68
Another related approach to making this distinction involves inquiring into
whether the reasonable protection of the rights and property of the clients
‘[require] that the persons giving such advice possess legal skill and a
knowledge of the law greater than that possessed by the average citizen’.69 If
the answer is in the affirmative, there are good grounds to conclude that it
reflects legal work, although it cannot blithely be assumed that it is necessarily
exclusively within the lawyer’s monopoly. Others, as noted earlier, may
directly or incidentally be expected to exercise legally-related skill and
knowledge exceeding the layperson. But it at least provides what constitutes
a compelling starting point, or litmus test, to set the parameters of
(un)authorised legal practice. In the words of a Western Australian judge, by
way of illustration:
66 See, eg, Re Hrones, 933 NE 2d 622 (Mass, 2010) (where the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts suspended the respondent lawyer (H) who had entered into a business
arrangement with a law graduate yet to pass the Bar examination (L), allowing the latter to
de facto practise law without effective supervision, finding that H actually assisted a
non-lawyer in the unauthorised practice of law, rather than merely inadequately supervising
L).
67 American Bar Association, Model Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 3-5 (1969).
68 Lola v Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, 620 Fed Appx 37, 45 (2nd Cir, 2015).
69 State ex rel Florida Bar v Sperry, 140 So 2d 587, 591 (Fla, 1962).
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Work of a merely clerical kind such as filling out blanks in a printed form or drawing
instruments of a generally recognised type that does not involve the determination
of the legal effect of special facts and conditions should not be regarded as legal
work. However, that is to be distinguished from the situation where an instrument is
shaped from a mass of facts and conditions, the legal effect of which must be
carefully determined by a mind trained in the existing laws in order to ensure a
specific result and to guard against others. In such a case more than the knowledge
of the layman is required and a charge for such services brings it within the practice
of the law.70
Beyond comparisons with laypersons, and instead drawing a line between
work by practising lawyers and that of non-lawyers whose domain
incidentally and/or in one or more specific contexts traverses into the legal
arena, there is wisdom in the observation that:
The interest of the public is not protected by the narrow specialization of an
individual who lacks the perspective and the orientation which comes only from a
thorough knowledge and understanding of basic legal concepts, of legal processes,
and of the interrelation of the law in all its branches.71
Perspective and orientation cannot be devalued in this (or other) contexts.
Assuming the requisite competence, it clearly feeds into the quality of the
advice supplied. There is accordingly value in legal advice supplied by
certified lawyers, even if alternatives may exist. Yet this value is not measured
only in competence, deriving prima facie from stringent academic and
practical requirements, and commitment to ongoing education. It is, in the
final analysis, also substantiated by enduring commitments to honesty and
loyalty (under the banner of fiduciary law), the latter without parallel in the
professional sphere.
The upshot, in conclusion, is that when speaking of the boundaries to
‘protective laws’, such as the prohibition on the unauthorised practice of law,
the following sentiments expressed by an American commentator arguably
sustain as much carriage today as when they were uttered nearly 40 years ago:
Lawyers have much to offer the public. Those qualities represented by the title
‘lawyer’ and attested by the lawyer’s [practising certificate] — character, legal
learning, proficiency, commitment to a high code of ethical standards and to a
tradition of honesty and fidelity — are resources of great value to the public ... It is
this set of qualities, and the titles and certificates that represent them, that should be
the subject of protective laws. No one but lawyers, trained in the law and committed
to the profession’s ideals, should be permitted to use the titles ‘lawyer’ or ‘attorney
at law’ or to in any way hold themselves out as lawyers ... But beyond that, no
restrictions whatever should inhibit the public in its exercise of freedom of choice
in obtaining needed services.72
70 Legal Practice Board v Giraudo [2010] WASC 4 (14 January 2010) [13] (Hall J) citing
Barristers’ Board v Palm Management Pty Ltd [1984] WAR 101 (21 June 1983) [108]
(Brinsden J).
71 Gardner v Conway, 48 NW 2d 788, 796 (Matson J) (Minn, 1951).
72 Barlow F Christensen, ‘The Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do Good Fences Really Make
Good Neighbours — Or Even Good Sense?’ [1980] American Bar Foundation Research
Journal 159, 214 (emphasis added).
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